Abstract-In a point-to-point communication system, which consists of a sender, a receiver, and a set of noiseless channels, the sender wishes to transmit a private message to the receiver through the channels, which may be eavesdropped by a wiretapper. The set of wiretap sets is arbitrary. The wiretapper can access any one but not more than one wiretap set. From each wiretap set, the wiretapper can obtain some partial information about the private message, which is measured by the equivocation of the message given the symbols obtained by the wiretapper. The security strategy is to encode the message with some random key at the sender. Only the message is required to be recovered at the receiver. Under this setting, we define an achievable rate tuple consisting of the size of the message, the size of the key, and the equivocation for each wiretap set. We first prove a tight rate region when both the message and the key are required to be recovered at the receiver. Then, we extend the result to the general case when only the message is required to be recovered at the receiver. Moreover, we show that even if stochastic encoding is employed at the sender, the message rate cannot be increased.
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S
HANNON launched information-theoretic security in his seminal paper [10] , where a sender wishes to transmit a private message to a receiver with the existence of a wiretapper. The model, referred to as the Shannon cipher system, requires that the wiretapper can obtain no information about the message. In this paper, we refer to it as perfect security for ease of discussion. To protect the message, the sender encodes the message with a random key which is shared with the receiver a priori but unknown to the wiretapper. The sender transmits the encrypted message in a public channel to the receiver such that the receiver can recover the message from the key and the encrypted message, while the wiretapper who observes the encrypted message only can obtain no information about the private message. The conclusion in [10] , Manuscript known as the perfect secrecy theorem, states that the size of the key can not be less than the size of the message if perfect security is required. Throughout this paper, the size of a random variable is measured by its Shannon entropy. A recent result by Ho et al. in [5] proved a stronger bound with the additional assumption that the key is independent of the message: in the Shannon cipher system, the size of the key is lower bounded by the logarithm of the cardinality of the support of the message alphabet. Secret sharing was studied by by Blakley [1] and Shamir [9] , where an even complex model was introduced. Ozarow and Wyner [7] also studied a similar model which they called the wiretap channel II. In their model, information is sent to the receiver through a set of noiseless point-topoint channels. It is assumed that the wiretapper can access any one but not more than one set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the problem under consideration. In [7] , A consists of all the subsets of the channel set with size r . The strategy to protect the private message is the same as that in the Shannon cipher system, namely that a key is employed to randomize the message. Specifically, they proved a lower bound on the size of the key which can be attained by a linear code. 1 This result is further generalized in Cheng and Yeung [3] for an arbitrary A. They proved a lower bound on the size of the key and showed that it can be also achieved by a linear code.
Imperfect secrecy was independently studied by Yamamoto [12] and Yeung [13] (p. 116). The communication model in [13] is the same as the model described in the Shannon cipher system, except that the wiretapper may obtain partial information about the message, which is measured by the mutual information between the message and the symbols obtained by the wiretapper. The imperfect secrecy theorem states that this mutual information is lower bounded by the difference between the size of the message and the size of the key. In [12] , an inequality equivalent to the imperfect secrecy theorem was used in the proof of converse coding theorems for a multiterminal secrecy system. When imperfect security is considered in a wiretap network G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of channels, Cai and Yeung [2] proved two tight bounds, one on the minimum size of the key and the other on the maximum size of the message, provided that the collection A of all possible wiretap sets consists of all subsets of E with size r and the information leakage about the message for each wiretap set is at most i log q, where i 1 The coding scheme in [7] was called a group code, which can be represented as a linear code. See [6] , [8] for details.
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. is a fixed integer satisfying 0 ≤ i ≤ r and q is the size of the alphabet. Xu and Chen [11] studied how to communicate securely over a network in which each channel may be noisy or noiseless. Their model is a single-source single-sink acyclic planar network without network coding and the communication between the source and the sink is subject to non-cooperative eavesdropping on each link, namely A consists of all the subsets of the channel set with a single channel. From each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper can obtain partial information about the message, which is measured by the equivocation of the confidential message given the symbols obtained by the wiretapper. They defined an achievable rate tuple consisting of the message rate, the key rate and the equivocation rate for each wiretap set. They proved sufficient conditions in terms of the communication rates and the network parameters for provably secure communication, along with an intuitive and efficient coding scheme. Furthermore, the derived achievable rate region is tight for several special cases. In the following, we refer to this model as the non-cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
In this work, we introduce a security model which generalizes the model in [7] . The communication model is the same as that in [7] . The main difference is that in our model A is arbitrary, and from each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper can obtain some information about the message. On the other hand, our model subsumes the noiseless case of the model in [11] , since the communication in a single-source singlesink network without network coding can be simplified as a point-to-point system. We also define an achievable rate tuple similar to that in [11] and a tight rate region is proved under this setting.
The rest is organized as follows. First, we present the problem formulation and introduce some related results in Section II. Then we present our main result on the rate region in Section III. Before proving the main result, we first establish an achievable subregion in Section IV with the additional requirement that the key is also recovered by the receiver. The main result is proved in Section V. In Section VI, we show that the message rate cannot be increased by introducing stochastic encoding at the sender.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED RESULT
A. Problem Formulation
The communication model (depicted in Fig. 1 ) in our problem is described as follows:
• The communication is between a transmitter s and a receiver t, which are connected by a set of point-topoint noiseless channels. Let E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e h } be the set of channels and h = |E|. Symbols transmitted on the channels are taken from a common alphabet F with |F | = q. For each channel e i , 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the channel capacity is C i log q, where C i is an integer. Denote the symbols transmitted on e i by Y e i .
• The message M is generated at the transmitter s according to a uniform distribution on the message set M. The key K , also generated at the transmitter s, takes value in an alphabet K according to the uniform distribution, and is independent of M, i.e.,
Besides K , no additional randomization is allowed inside the network. The transmitter needs to send the ciphertext (encrypted message) to the receiver and the receiver needs to recover the message with zero error. Note that the key is only known to the sender. The rates of the message and the key are defined as follows.
• Let A be the set of wiretap sets and |A| = d. Each wiretapper can access at most one wiretap set in A.
Assume that the wiretapper knows the encoding and decoding functions but not the private key K . 
The achievable rate tuple is defined as follows.
Definition 1: The encoder is a function f such that
The decoder is a function g such that
The corresponding rate tuple (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) is an achievable rate tuple if f and g satisfy that:
for all k 1 , k 2 ∈ K. This guarantees that any two messages are distinguishable at the receiver; i.e.,
2) The constraints (4) holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d. Next, we define the achievable rate tuple by a block code in terms of M, K and
where
The inequality (10) means that, for any positive real number ε, there exists a positive integer n 0 such that
The rate region R is defined as the set of all achievable rate tuples (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ). In the sequel, we refer to this model as the cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
In the sequel, we assume that the base of the logarithm in the entropy quantities (e.g., H (X), I (X; Y )) is q, so that the factor (log q) −1 can be omitted in (2)- (10).
B. Related Result 1) Perfect and Imperfect Secrecy:
The perfect secrecy theorem in [10] is stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Perfect Secrecy Theorem): Let X be the plaintext, Y be the ciphertext, and K be the key in a secret key cryptosystem. If perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., I (X; Y
where W ⊆ V contains the source node s and W c = V \ W contains the destination node t, and refer to the set of edges from W to W c as the cut-set.
For the wiretap network model [2] , the following result related to the perfect secrecy theorem was proved.
Theorem 2: In a wiretap network, let K be the key and Y I be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I . Then
If I is contained in a cut-set W , then 
In the above theorem, if I (X; Y ) = 0, then (14) becomes (11), i.e., the theorem reduces to the perfect secrecy theorem. In [12] , it was proved that for any secret key cryptosystem,
which is equivalent to (14) .
2) Secure Coding Over Routing Networks:
The system model in [11] is a single-source single-sink directed acyclic network with the assumption that each wiretapper can access only one channel and there is no network coding in the network. Each channel in the network may be noisy or noiseless.
When all the channels in the network are noiseless, the network can be simplified as a point-to-point communication system, in which each channel is a path from the source node to the destination node in the original network and the set of wiretap sets A is arbitrary. Hence our model subsumes the non-cooperative model for this special case.
In [11] , an achievable rate region of rate tuples was obtained for noisy channels, and the region was shown to be tight for several special cases. Based on the achievable rate region, they also gave an algorithm for constructing a secure code on the network.
The achievable rate region for noiseless channels is stated below.
Theorem 4 (11, Th. 2): A rate tuple (R
for all e ∈ E and there exist auxiliary numbers r e such that
0 ≤ r e ≤ C e ; R e ≤ R M + R K − r e . In the above, R e and C e correspond to R i and C i in our formulation respectively; E Cut is the set of channels across a given cut Cut.
III. THE RATE REGION
The main result of this paper is a characterization of the rate region R given by the following theorem.
and there exist r i 's such that
Our model is a generalization of the wiretap channel II studied in [7] , because here we consider imperfect secrecy instead of perfect secrecy. By letting A = {A : A ⊆ E, and |A| = r }, we can recover the result in [7] . Before proving Theorem 5, we first study a subregion of R.
IV. A SUBREGION OF THE RATE REGION
By requiring both the message and the key to be recovered at the receiver, we can define a subregion R of the rate region R. The definition of R is given below.
Definition 3: The encoder is a function f such that
The corresponding rate tuple 
A. Converse
In this section, we prove that if (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) ∈ R , then the constraints (23)- (28) hold. Since the converse is valid for both single-shot coding (n = 1) and block coding (n ≥ 1), we prove it only for single-shot coding for simplicity. The constraints (24) and (25) are obvious.
We first prove the constraint (23). By the constraint (4),
Hence the constraints (23)-(25) hold. Let us consider an equivalent condition of the constraint (4).
The constraint (4) is equivalent to
By (29) and (30), 0 ≤ c i ≤ R M .
Next, we prove a lemma which generalizes the inequality (12) in Theorem 2.
Lemma 1: In a cooperative imperfect secrecy system, let M be the message, K be the key and Y I be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I . Then
In the next theorem, we prove the constraints (26), (27), and (28).
Lemma 2: For any tuple (R
Proof: By Lemma 1 and the inequality (31), for each wiretap set I i ,
For each channel e i , 1
Since Y (e i :1≤i≤h) is a function of (M, K ) and (M, K ) can be recovered by Y (e i :1≤i≤h) ,
Hence,
which is equivalent to
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h, let
...,e i−1 ) ).
Then for all
which completes the proof.
B. Achievability
In this section, we prove that (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) ∈ R if there exists (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r h ) such that the constraints (23)- (28) are satisfied.
In the following, a special code in which the symbols sent on the channels are mutually independent is studied. We design a block code with length n as follows. The sender generates M and K at rates R M and R K , respectively, and sends symbols on each channel e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h) at rate r i . Next, we prove that the tuple (R M , R K , R i:1≤i≤d ) can be attained by a linear code.
Let the symbols on channel e i (1 ≤ i ≤ h) be Y e i . For simplicity, assume that the quantities c i (Recall the definition in (30)), C i , R M , R K , and r i are all rational numbers, so that there is a sufficiently large n such that
are all integers. Thus, by (26), (27), and (28), n M , n K , and
For a matrix A, we write the number of rows and columns of A as row(A) and col(A), respectively. The following two lemmas are instrumental in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 3: Let F q be a finite field of size q, A, B be given matrices with the same number of rows and (A, B) be the concatenated matrix of A and B. Let Y = AM + B K , where rank(A, B) = row(A, B). If M and K are uniformly distributed on F m q and F k q , respectively, and I (M; K ) = 0, then I (Y ; M) = rank(A, B) − rank(B).
Proof: 
are linearly independent, then it is possible to choose b j such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
are linearly independent. Specifically, b j is chosen such that it is independent of the set of vectors in (45) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m; i.e.,
Since the cardinality of a subspace in F n q is finite, we need to show that the set above is nonempty. Toward this end, consider
Therefore,
The remaining of this subsection is largely about the following theorem. . Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n M +n K be all the symbols to send, where the first n 1 symbols are sent on e 1 , the next n 2 symbols are sent on e 2 , so on and so forth, and the last n h symbols are sent on e h . We construct x i 's according to their positions in the sequence.
Generate n K mutually independent symbols K = (k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n K ) from F q . Transmit K at the first n K positions, i.e.,
where 
is a row vector to be determined in the following steps.
We need to construct {b i :
(a) Both M and K can be recovered at node t. (b) The constraint (31) (which is equivalent to (4)) holds for all the wiretap sets. From the previous discussion, we can see that receiver t can recover K from the symbols in the first n K positions, and by (50), M can be also recovered via
Hence, the condition (a) is satisfied by any choice of b i 's. Moreover, it can readily be seen that
In matrix form, (48) and (50) can be written as ⎛
In the above, 0 is an n K × n M zero matrix and I n K ×n K is an n K × n K identity matrix. Recall that the symbols obtained in
where A I i and B I i are the corresponding sub-matrices of A and B, respectively. We now derive a sufficient condition for (31) to be satisfied. This condition will be used for the construction of b i 's. Since
By Lemma 3,
The constraint (31) is equivalent to
Hence, it is sufficient to construct B I i such that
For e j ∈I i n j , by (44), we obtain that
By (52),
In summary, by (55) and (58), we have
In order for (54) to be satisfied, in light of (59), it suffices to construct b i 's such that for all i , 1
i.e., B I i is full rank. The row vectors b j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n K , have been defined according to (49). In the following, we will construct b j , 
then for all i , 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the equality (60) holds by letting
which implies (61).
Assume that for j equal to some l ≥ n K , we have successfully constructed {b i :
Now in order for (62) to be satisfied with l + 1 in place of l, we need to choose b l+1 such that for each wiretap set
The existence of b l+1 is guaranteed by Lemma 4 provided 
By comparing the constraints (63)- (67) for R and the constraints (16)- (20) for R, we see that they are identical except that (64) and (17) are different. Specifically, (64) is obtained from (17) by setting the inequality therein to equality. In R , when C i 's are fixed, r i , R M , R K , and R j 's are all bounded. However, in R, though r i , R M and R j 's are bounded, R K can be arbitrarily large. Therefore, R R in general. However, we will show in Corollary 2 at the end of the next section that requiring K to be reconstructed at the receiver by no means impairs the performance of the coding scheme.
V. THE GENERAL RATE REGION
In this section, we prove Theorem 5. First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5: In a cooperative imperfect secrecy system, let M be the message and Y I be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I . Then
which completes the proof. In this lemma, if we let I (M; Y I ) = 0, then the inequality (68) reduces to
which is the inequality (13) in Theorem 2.
A. Converse
The constraints (16) and the left hand side of (20) can be proved by the the same method in Section IV-A. Let us focus on the remaining constraints.
Since
Since M can be recovered from Y (e i :1≤i≤h) ,
For any wiretap set
By the constraint (4) and Lemma 5, for all 1 Furthermore, (71) implies
and (72) implies
Finally, (73) implies
Hence, we prove all the constraints in (16)-(20).
B. Achievability
In the above converse, the only constraint on R K is By Theorem 5 and 6, one of the key findings revealed by our formulation of the problem is that rate regions with and without the key decodability condition imposed are different.
VI. STOCHASTIC ENCODER
We have already established the rate region when the encoding at the sender is deterministic, i.e., the information symbols on all the channels are a function of M and K . In this section, in stead of the deterministic encoder, a stochastic encoder is employed at the sender, where the information symbols on all the channels are no longer a function of M and K . Hence, the size of K is not of our concern as extra randomness is injected by the stochastic encoder. We continue to assume that no randomness is introduced inside the network. We show that under this more general model, the characterization of the message rates remains the same as that in Theorem 5.
The communication model is depicted in Fig. 2 . The problem statement is almost the same as that in Section II, with the only exception that the symbols on the channels is determined by a stochastic matrix. In principle, a stochastic encoder can be equivalently transformed into a deterministic encoder by introducing an auxiliary random variable which is independent of the encoder input (see [14, p. 141] ). Denote the auxiliary random variable in the block code by S n , which may depend on M n and K n . Now, we summarize the conditions that hold when the encoder may be stochastic. At the sender,
The information symbols on the channels satisfy that
Since the message M n can be decoded at the receiver,
As required, for each wiretap set I j ,
Next, we show that the message rate cannot be increased by using a stochastic encoder, i.e., conditions (16) and (18) - (20) continue to hold.
It is easy to verify condition (16). Close examination of the proof of Lemma 5 reveals that the lemma remains valid in light of (74) 
which is condition (18). Hence, the message rate cannot be increased by introducing stochastic encoding at the sender.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained a tight rate region for the cooperative imperfect secrecy model in terms of a linear program, of which the key idea is from the imperfect secrecy theorem. Similar models and problems can be defined and discussed on more general communication networks. Although the rate regions are still open for these general cases, our work has paved the way for further investigation.
